Giraffe Associate Director Mary Ella Keblusek
is sticking her neck way out as part of a documentary film crew  in the conflicted Niger Delta region of Nigeria. The title of their film is "Sweet Crude" and it's about a conflict in which this crew now finds themselves right in the middle. Here is their report:

First Things First for the Niger Delta
A Proposal from a Documentary Film Crew
August 27 th, 2006

This moment in the Niger Delta

Recent events have brought us to a new sense of urgency regarding the critical situation in the Niger Delta, the subject of our documentary, Sweet Crude. The need for nonviolent approaches to this volatile situation has never been more important.

• Sunday, August 20 th: Three boats of Ijaw youths who had been ordered by Ijaw elders to aid in the release of a hostage were fired upon by the Nigerian Military Joint Task Force (JTF) unprovoked. Two of the three boats contained unarmed people; the people in the third boat did not fire their weapons until fired upon. Fifteen people, among them 10 militants and the hostage, were killed. JTF has refused to release the corpses. (The bodies were subsequently released, after a 6-day delay.)
• Friday, August 25 th: Nigerian soldiers burned hundreds of slum houses in Port Harcourt near where a soldier was killed during the kidnapping of foreign oil workers.

As of the date of this document, there has been no retaliation for the above from the militant groups, as they consider the hope that the international community will step in. This document is written in the hopes that if U.S. and international pressure is applied in the manner described here, perhaps the militants will continue to stand down.

Introduction

We are a documentary film crew. We have been in the Niger Delta, specifically Delta State and the creeks, for close to three weeks. In the course of our work we have interacted with and filmed people from a variety of stakeholder positions: women and children in villages; traditional leaders; state and local government officials; regional development council members; youths; militants; oil company workers, security personnel and executives; Nigerian military; federal government representatives; and NGOs.

What we see is a significant escalation of the threat of violent response by people in the Delta to longstanding government corruption, environmental devastation, extreme poverty, military aggression and general endemic disregard for the people of this oil-rich region. The people know that their region produces 90% of Nigeria’s wealth yet it is one of the poorest regions in all of Africa. The people are fed up. As competent observers, we see and hear sign after sign that crisis is imminent.

We are not trained diplomats or peacemakers. Although we arrived in the Niger Delta to make a documentary about this moment, we find ourselves now compelled to speak out b because nobody else seems to be doing so. International intervention may now be the only way to stop the beginning of a protracted and bloody struggle that costs many lives, further degrades the quality of life in the Delta (and turns ever more people here against the central government) and threatens the region’s vital oil exports at a time when interruptions of supplies from Alaska have already created a crisis in supply and price.

We do not presume to have all the answers to a conflict that is complex and longstanding. As filmmakers we are, however, good listeners. The following is a list of issues we have heard most loudly from the stakeholders of this region. Our intention is to send this document to representatives of each of these groups inside Nigeria, as well as the people and groups internationally who may already be engaged with Niger Delta issues and solutions, or who should be compelled to engage.

We have also tapped an extensive network of connections to contact U.S. senators regarding calling for peace talks. We are attempting to bring media attention to this unfolding story, to shift the focus from kidnapping and violent response to the potential for bringing the parties together for peace negotiations.

We believe this juncture is a critical window of opportunity to forestall what is now a real and imminent threat of protracted violence. There needs to be an international force to stand between the combatants. And there needs to be negotiations with all parties given equal power in coming to the table to discuss solutions. The grievances of the people of the Delta are real and they will not go away. This time, they must be dealt with fairly because the people of the Delta will not accept anything else.

The issues

Definition of issues requires depth rather than general, blanket statements. The international community doesn’t understand the history, complexities and subtleties operating in the Delta, so it would be difficult to fully grasp the implications of statements like “resource control,” “self-determination” and “demilitarize the region.” To move forward effectively, there needs to be as much specificity as possible around each discussion point.

1. Demilitarization of the Niger Delta.

• A step-by-step process is needed, starting with a signed agreement that includes an outline of incremental steps.
• Experienced third parties should be called in to help draft a specific and detailed plan, including timeline; transitional and final percentages of military, state, private security, locals; etc.
• The plan should be presented as requests/recommendations, rather than demands.
• It is important to include the recognition that de facto occupation of the riverine areas by the JTF has in effect caused the level of threat of armed conflict—simple withdrawal won’t solve the underlying issues.
• Examine test cases of communities that have less military guard, for example Oporoza. How did this come about? Why is it working better than heavily militarized areas? Look at successful demilitarization elsewhere in the world, for example Northern Ireland, New York City. Look at Joel Bisina’s (NGO Niger Delta Professionals for Development) work with Chevron training locals for non-armed security. This works because of relationships/connections: for example, locals will be in a position to spot and tip off about someone on their way to do bunkering. They don’t need a weapon—can just make a phone call.
• The Nigerian federal government needs to be accountable to due process when criminality is suspected. Nigerian democracy has not fully transitioned from military rule and must do so to de-escalate the Delta situation. Oil companies should be applying pressure to do this.

2. Reframing of the resource control conversation.

• Increasing the derivation percentage to 25% doesn’t get at the root cause of the problem. Clearly the 13% allocation isn’t working. Increasing the number before solving the bigger issue won’t help. It distracts attention and even if granted, probably won’t get more money into the communities. In fact, it will make the rich and corrupt even richer.
• Continuing the percentage argument first will also tend to fuel the power struggle between north and south.